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VOLITION AND
THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Hakwan Lau

People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced
by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that
under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior
and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are
consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes
us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals.
However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong
signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find
that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.

Introduction
Many acts of volition seem to require conscious effort. We consciously
initiate spontaneous motor movements. We cancel planned actions at will.
We deliberately avoid particular actions. We intentionally shift our action
plans in order to pursue different goals. Sometimes, theorists say, these
are the functions of consciousness, as if evolution has equipped us with
the gift of consciousness just to perform these acts. Without consciousness, presumably, we would only be able to perform much simpler actions
that are no more sophisticated than embellished reflexes.
In this paper I will review available evidence to see if these intuitive
claims are empirically supported. Recent studies in cognitive neuroscience suggest that many of these complex processes can actually be performed without consciousness. Or at least, many of them can be directly
influenced by unconscious information. This calls into question what is
the true function of consciousness, if not to enable us to deliberate over
our actions. I will end by discussing what is logically required for an experiment to demonstrate the true function of consciousness.
1. Spontaneous Motor Initiation
Motor actions that are made not in immediate or direct response to external stimuli can be said to be spontaneously initiated. These are also sometimes called self-paced or self-generated actions. For instance, one may
choose to casually flex one’s wrist while sitting in a dark room, out of one’s
own free choice and timing, not to react to anything in particular. Some
philosophers have argued that in cases like that, it should seem obvious
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that the action is caused by one’s conscious intention.1 Whereas one may
argue that fast reactions to external stimuli may be driven by unconscious
reflex (e.g., a runner leaping forward upon hearing the starting whistle),
spontaneous actions do not seem to have any immediate cause but the
conscious intention itself.
However, it has been shown that there is preparatory activity in the
brain that starts at as early as 1–2 seconds before spontaneous actions are
executed. This piece of one of the most perplexing findings in cognitive
neuroscience was originally reported by Kornhuber and Deecke in the
1960s.2 They placed electrodes on the scalp to measure electroencephalography (EEG) while subjects made spontaneous movements at their own

Figure 1. A typical recording of the readiness potential (RP) preceding spontaneous movements. The RP is usually recorded at the top of the scalp, above medial
frontal premotor areas. It gradually ramps up, beginning about 1–2 seconds before
movement and peaking around the time of movement execution. Figure edited
and adapted from Haggard and Eimer, 1999.

timing. The EEG data that were time-locked to the point of motor execution (as measured by muscle contraction indicated by electromyography,
EMG) were averaged over many trials, which produced an event-related
potential (ERP) known as the bereitschaftspotential (BP) or readiness potential (RP). The readiness potential is slowly rising, peaking at around
the point of action execution and starting from 1–2 seconds before that
(see Fig. 1). The readiness potential is most pronounced at electrodes near
the vertex (Cz in the EEG coordinate system), which is directly above the
medial premotor areas (including the supplementary motor area, SMA,
1
J. R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
2
H. Kornhuber, and L. Deecke, “Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkurbewegungen und
passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale,“
Pflügers Archive 284 (1965), pp. 1–17.
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pre-supplementary motor area, pre-SMA, and the cingulate motor areas
below them). It is generally believed that one major source of the readiness potential lies in the medial premotor areas.3
The demonstration of the readiness potential calls into question whether spontaneous movements are really caused by the preceding conscious
intentions. Intuitively, conscious intentions seem to cause motor actions
almost immediately—it seems to take much less time than 1–2 seconds.
This could mean that the brain starts to prepare for the actions way before
we consciously initiate them.
Benjamin Libet and colleagues empirically studied the timing of the
conscious intention in relation to the readiness potential and the action.4
To measure the onset of conscious intention, he invented a creative but
controversial paradigm which is sometimes called the “Libet clock paradigm.” In those studies, subjects watched a dot revolving around a clock
face at a speed of 2.56 second per cycle, while they flexed their wrist spontaneously (see Fig. 2). After the action was finished, subjects were required
to report the location of the dot when they “first felt the urge” to produce
the action, i.e., the onset of intention. The subjects might say it was at 3

Figure 2. The Libet clock paradigm. A. The subject views a dot rotating slowly
(2.56 seconds per cycle) around a clock face and waits for an urge to move to arise
spontaneously. When the urge arrives, the subject makes a movement (e.g. a key
press). B. After making the movement, the subject estimates the earliest time at
which the intention to move was experienced. To carry out this time estimate, the
subject moves the dot to the position on the clock face corresponding to the time
when intention was first felt. In a common control condition, the subject uses the
clock to estimate the time of movement rather than the onset of intention. Figure
edited and adapted from Lau et al., 2007.

3
T. Ball et al., “The Role of Higher-order Motor Areas in Voluntary Movement as Revealed by High-resolution EEG and fMRI,” NeuroImage 10 (1999), pp. 682–694. M. Erdler et
al., “Supplementary Motor Area Activation Preceding Voluntary Movement Is Detectable
with a Whole-Scalp Magnetoencephalography System,” NeuroImage 11 (2000), pp. 697–707.
F. Weilke et al., “Time-resolved fMRI of Activation Patterns in M1 and SMA During Complex
Voluntary Movement,” Journal of Neurophysiology 85 (2001), pp. 1858–1863. R. Cunnington,
C. Windischberger, L. Deecke, and E. Moser, ”The Preparation and Readiness for Voluntary
Movement: A High-field Event-related fMRI Study of the Bereitschafts-BOLD Response,”
NeuroImage 20 (2003), pp. 404–412.
4
B. Libet, E. W. Wright, and C. A. Gleason, ”Preparation- or Intention-to-act, in Relation to
Pre-event Potentials Recorded at the Vertex,” Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 56 (1983), pp. 367–372.
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o’clock or 4 o’clock position when they first felt the intention, for instance.
This way the subjects could time and report the onset of their intention,
and the experimenter could then work out actually when the action was
produced, and hence the temporal distance between the two. Libet and
colleagues reported that subjects on average report the onset of intention
to be about 250 ms before major execution.
Many people feel uncomfortable with the fact that the onset of the
readiness potential seems to be so much earlier than the onset of intention, and some have tried to explain away the gap. Libet and colleagues
have tried to study the onset of the readiness potential more carefully, discarding trials which might have been “contaminated” by pre-planning of
action well before the action, as reported by the subjects. By only looking
at the trials where the actions were supposed to be genuinely spontaneous, Libet and colleagues reported that the onset of the readiness potential is only about 500 ms before action execution.5 However, this is still
clearly earlier than the reported onset of intention. And by discarding so
many trials, it may be that the analysis just lacked the power to detect an
earlier onset.
Some have argued that the onset of readiness potential might be an artifact due to the averaging needed to produce the ERP.6 However, Romo
and Schultz have made recordings from neurons in the medial premotor areas while monkeys made self-paced movements.7 It was found that
these neurons in fact fired as early as 2.6 seconds before movement onset.
Others have argued that the readiness potential may not reflect the
specific and causal aspects of motor initiation. However, as mentioned
earlier, it is likely that the readiness potential largely originates from the
medial premotor areas. Lesion to these areas can abolish the production of
spontaneous actions.8 These areas also contain neurons that code specific
action plans.9 Further, when people use the Libet clock paradigm to time
their own intentions, there is attentional modulation of activity in the medial pre-SMA, as if people were reading information off the area which is
likely to be a source of the readiness potential.10
Ibid.
J. Miller, and J. A. Trevena. “Cortical Movement Preparation and Conscious Decisions:
Averaging Artifacts and Timing Biases,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 308–313.
7
R. Romo, and W. Schultz, “Neuronal Activity Preceding Self-initiated or Externally
Timed Arm Movements in Area 6 of Monkey Cortex,” Experimental Brain Research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 67 (1987), pp. 656–662.
8
D. Thaler, Y. C. Chen, P. D. Nixon, C. E. Stern, and R. E. Passingham, “The Functions of
the Medial Premotor Cortex. I. Simple Learned Movements,” Experimental Brain Research.
Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 102 (1995), pp. 445–460.
9
J. Tanji, and K. Shima. “Supplementary Motor Cortex in Organization of Movement,”
European Neurology 36 Supp. 1 (1996), pp. 13–19. K. Shima, and J. Tanji, “Both Supplementary
and Presupplementary Motor Areas are Crucial for the Temporal Organization of Multiple
Movements,” Journal of Neurophysiology 80 (1998), pp. 3247–3260.
10
H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, P. Haggard, and R. E. Passingham, “Attention to Intention,”
Science 303 (2004), pp. 1208–1210.
5
6
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The Libet clock method has also received considerable criticism. It involves timing across modalities, and could be susceptible to various biases.11 However, it is unlikely that all these biases are in the direction that
would help to narrow the gap between the onsets of the readiness potential and intention. Some have actually suggested that the different biases
may point to different directions and thus just cancel each other out.12
Also, in the original experiments by Libet and colleagues, there were control conditions that tested for the basic accuracy of the clock. They asked
subjects to use the clock to time either the onset of movement execution,
or in another condition to time the onset of tactile stimuli. Since the actual onsets of these events are objectively measurable, they could estimate
the subjective error of onset reports produced by the clock method. They
found the error to be in the order of about 50 ms, i.e., much smaller than
the gap between the onsets of the readiness potential and intention.
The basic results of Libet and colleagues have also been replicated in
several different laboratories.13 In general, the same pattern is found, that
the onset of intention is either around or later than 250 ms before action
execution, which seems to confirm our intuition that conscious intentions
seem to be followed by motor actions almost immediately. In fact, given
that the readiness potential could start as early as 1–2 seconds before
action execution, it is hard to imagine how the onset of intention could
coincide or precede the readiness potential, unless one thinks of intention as a kind of prior intention,14 like the general plan that is formed
at the beginning of the experimental session when the subject agrees to
produce some actions in the next half an hour or so. We shall discuss this
kind of higher-cognitive “intention” later in this paper. However, the intention we are concerned with here is the immediate “urge” to produce
the motor action.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that conscious intention, i.e., the
immediate feeling of motor initiation, is unlikely to be the “first unmoved
mover” in triggering spontaneous motor movements. It is likely to be preceded by unconscious brain activity that may contribute to action initiation. What, then, is conscious intention for?
11
B. Libet, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary
Action,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985), pp. 529–566. G. Gomes, “The Interpretation
of Libet’s Results on the Timing of Conscious Events: A Commentary,” Consciousness and
Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 221–230; discussion 308–313, 314–325. S. Joordens, M. van Duijn,
and T. M. Spalek, “When Timing the Mind One Should Also Mind the Timing: Biases in the
Measurement of Voluntary Actions,” Consciousness and Cognition 11.2 (2002), pp. 231–240;
discussion 308–313. S. Klein, “Libet’s Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act:
A Commentary,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 273–279; discussion 304–325. J. A.
Trevena, and J. Miller, “Cortical Movement Preparation Before and After a Conscious Decision to Move,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 162–190; discussion pp. 314–325.
12
Klein, “Libet’s Research.”
13
E.g., Lau et al., “Attention to Intention.” P. Haggard, and M. Eimer, “On the Relation
between Brain Potentials and the Awareness of Voluntary Movements,” Experimental Brain
Research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 126 (1999), pp. 128–313.
14
J. R. Searle, Intentionality.
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2. Conscious Veto?
Libet’s interpretation of the timing-of-intention results is that although intention may not be early enough to be the first cause of action, the fact that
it is before action execution means that it could still be part of the causal chain. Maybe the decision to move is initiated unconsciously, but the
awareness of intention may allow us to “veto,” i.e., to cancel the action.
This seems to be a possibility. Libet and colleagues as well as other researchers have performed experiments where subjects prepare for an action and then cancel it in the last moment, just before it is executed.15 The
fact that we have the ability to “veto” an action seems beyond doubt. The
question, however, is whether having the conscious intention is critical.
Can the choice of veto be preceded by unconscious activity, just as the intention to act is preceded by the readiness potential? Or are actions sometimes unconsciously vetoed, even without our awareness?
Some recent evidence suggests that the conscious intention may not
facilitate a veto. As mentioned earlier, when people were using the Libet
clock to time the onset of their intentions, there was attentional modulation of activity in the pre-SMA. These data have been subsequently further
analyzed, and it has been shown that subjects who showed large degree
of attentional modulation tended to also report the onset of intention to be
early.16 One interpretation could be that attention biases the judgment of
onset to be earlier. It was found in another experiment that this was also
true when people used the Libet clock to time the onset of the motor execution. The higher the level of fMRI activity modulated by attention, the
earlier subjects reported the onset to be, even though on average subjects
reported the onsets to be earlier than they actually were, which means a
bias to the negative (i.e., early) direction produced more erroneous rather
more precise reports. In general, the principle of attentional prior entry17
suggests that attention to an event speeds up its perception and negatively
biases the reported onset. If this were true in the case of the Libet experiments, this could mean that attention might have exaggerated the 250 ms
onset, i.e., had subjects not been required to attend to their intentions in
order to perform the timing tasks, the true onset of conscious intention
may well be much later than 250 ms prior to action execution. This calls
into question whether we have enough time to consider the veto.
Another study reported that some patients with lesion to the parietal
cortex reported the onset of intention to be as late as 50 ms prior to action
execution.18 If the awareness of intention allows one to veto actions, one
15
Libet et al., “Preparation- or Intention-to-act.” M. Brass, and P. Haggard, “To Do or Not to
Do: The Neural Signature of Self-control,” The Journal of Neuroscience 27 (2007), pp. 9141–9145.
16
H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, and R. E. Passingham, “On Measuring the Perceived Onsets of
Spontaneous Actions,” The Journal of Neuroscience 26 (2006), pp. 7265–7271.
17
D. I. Shore, C. Spence, and R. M. Klein, “Visual Prior Entry,” Psychological Science 12
(2001), pp. 205–212.
18
A. Sirigu et al., “Altered Awareness of Voluntary Action after Damage to the Parietal
Cortex,” Nature Neuroscience 7 (2004), pp. 80–84.
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might expect these patients to have much less time to consciously evaluate
spontaneous intentions and cancel the inappropriate ones. This could be
quite disastrous to daily life functioning. Yet there were no such reports
about these patients.
Finally, in another study, single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) were sent to the medial premotor areas (targeting the preSMA).19 Again, subjects were instructed to produce spontaneous movements and to time the onset of intentions and movement execution using the Libet clock. Surprisingly, although TMS was applied after motor
execution, it has an effect on the reported onsets. No matter whether TMS
was applied immediately after action execution or with a 200 ms delay, the
stimulation exaggerated the temporal distance between the reported onsets of intention and movement, as if people reported a prolonged period
of conscious intending. One interpretation may be that TMS injected noisy
activity into the area and the intention monitoring mechanism did not
distinguish this from endogenously generated activity that is supposed to
represent intention. However, what is crucial is the fact that the reported
onsets can be manipulated even after the action is finished. This seems to
suggest that our awareness of intention may be constructed after the facts,
or at least not completely determined before the action is finished. If conscious intentions are not formed before the action, they certainly cannot
play any role in facilitating veto, let alone causing it.
This interpretation may seem wild, but it is consistent with other proposals. . For instance, Wegner has suggested that maybe the conscious will
is an illusion.20 The sense of agency is often inferred post hoc, based on
many contextual factors. Wegner cites experiments to support these claims.
One example is a study on “facilitated communication.”21 Subjects (playing the role of “facilitators”) were asked to place their fingers on two keys
of a keyboard, while a confederate (playing the role of “communicator”)
placed his or her fingers on top of those of the subject. Subjects were given
headphones with which they listened to questions of varying difficulty.
Confederates were given headphones as well, and subjects were led to believe that the confederates would be hearing the same questions, although
in fact the confederates heard nothing. Subjects were told to detect subtle,
unconscious movements in the confederate’s fingers following each question. When such movements were detected, the subject should press the
corresponding key in order to answer on the confederate’s behalf. It was
found that subjects answered easy questions well above chance levels. If
they had performed the task strictly according to the instructions, however,
they should have performed at chance. Therefore, subjects must have been
directing their own key presses. Nonetheless, they attributed a significant
19
H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, and R. E. Passingham, “Manipulating the Experienced Onset of
Intention after Action Execution,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19 (2007), pp. 81–90.
20
D. M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002).
21
D. M. Wegner, V. A. Fuller, and B. Sparrow, “Clever Hands: Uncontrolled Intelligence in
Facilitated Communication,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (2003), pp. 5–19.
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causal role for the key presses to the confederate. The degree to which subjects answered easy questions correctly was not correlated with the degree
to which they attributed causal responsibility to confederates, suggesting
that the generation of action and attribution of action to an agent are independent processes.
To summarize, although theorists have speculated that the awareness
of intention may play some role in allowing us to cancel or edit our actions, considerable doubt has been cast by recent empirical evidence.
3. Exclusion and Inhibition
Another kind of situation that seems to require conscious deliberation involves the need to avoid a particular action or response. This is related
to “vetoing” as described above, except that the action being inhibited is
not necessarily self-paced, and may be specified externally. One example
would be to perform stem completion while avoiding a particular word.
So for instance, the experimenter may ask the subjects to produce any
word starting with letter D (i.e., completing a ‘stem’), but avoid the word
‘dinner.’ So subjects can produce ‘dog,’ ‘danger,’ ‘dear,’ etc., but if they
produce the word ‘dinner,’ it would be counted as an error. This is called
the exclusion task.22
One interesting aspect of the exclusion task is that people can perform
well only if they clearly perceive and remember the target of exclusion
(i.e., the word ‘dinner’ in the foregoing example). If the target of exclusion
is presented very briefly and followed by a mask, such that it was only
very weakly perceived, people may fail to exclude it.23 In fact, they tend to
produce exactly the word they should be avoiding with higher likelihood
than if they were not presented with the word at all. It has been argued
that this exclusion failure phenomenon is the hallmark of unconscious
processing.24 The weak perception of the target probably produced a representation for the word, but because the signal was not strong enough to
reach the level of conscious processing, we are unable to inhibit the corresponding response.
In addition to the intuitive appeal, the notion that consciousness is
required for exclusion is also supported by a case study of a blindsight
patient.25 Subject GY has a lesion to the left primary visual cortex (V1), and
reports that most of his right visual field is subjectively blind. However,
in a forced-choice situation he can discriminate simple stimuli well above
22
L. L. Jacoby, D. S. Lindsay, and J. P. Toth, “Unconscious Influences Revealed. Attention,
Awareness, and Control,” The American Psychologist 47 (1992), pp. 802–809.
23
J. A. Debner, and L. L. Jacoby, “Unconscious Perception: Attention, Awareness, and
Control,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 20 (1994), pp.
304–317. P. M. Merikle, S. Joordens, and J. A. Stolz, “Measuring the Relative Magnitude of
Unconscious Influences,” Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1995), pp. 422–349.
24
Jacoby et al., “Unconscious Influences Revealed.”
25
N. Persaud, and A. Cowey, “Blindsight is Unlike Normal Conscious Vision: Evidence
from an Exclusion Task,” Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2007), pp. 1050–1055.
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chance level in his “blind” field.26 In one study he was required to perform
an exclusion task, i.e., to say the location (up or down) where the target
was not presented.27 Whereas he could do this easily in the normal field, he
failed the task when stimuli were presented to his blind field. Note that he
did significantly worse than chance in the blind field, as if the unconscious
signal drove the response directly and inflexibly, defying exclusion control. This seems to support the conclusion that consciousness is required
for exclusion.
The general idea that inhibition requires consciousness seems to be
supported by other studies too, including those that do not employ the
exclusion paradigm. One study tested subjects’ ability to ignore distracting moving dots, while doing a central task that has nothing to do with
the distractors.28 It was found that if the motion of the distractor was above
the perceptual threshold, people could ignore the dots and inhibit the
distraction successfully. Somewhat paradoxically, when the motion was
below perceptual threshold, people could not ignore the dots and were
distracted. The results from brain imaging seem to suggest that when the
motion of the stimuli was strong, it activated the prefrontal cortex, and
triggered it to suppress the motion signal. When the motion of the stimuli
was below perceptual threshold, however, the signal failed to trigger the
inhibitory functions in the prefrontal cortex, and therefore the motion signal was not suppressed and thus remained distracting.
However, the notion that flexible control or inhibition of perceptual
signal requires consciousness is not without its critics.29 One problem
becomes clear when we consider the motion distractor example above.
“Conscious signal” here seems to be the same thing as a strong signal,
driven by larger motion strength in the stimuli. Obviously, signals have to
be strong enough to reach the prefrontal cortex in order to trigger the associating executions functions. Do unconscious stimuli fail to be excluded
because we are not conscious of them, or is it just because the signal is not
strong enough? Or, are the two explanations one and the same? We will
come back to this issue in the final section of this paper.
Other researchers have reported evidence that seems to support unconscious inhibition. For instance, in one study people were asked to
26
L. Weiskrantz, Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986). L. Weiskrantz, Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
27
Persaud and Cowey, “Blindsight.”
28
Y. Tsushima, Y. Sasaki, and T. Watanabe, “Greater Disruption Due to Failure of Inhibitory Control on an Ambiguous Distractor,” Science 314 (2006), pp. 1786–1788.
29
M. Snodgrass, “Disambiguating Conscious and Unconscious Influences: Do Exclusion
Paradigms Demonstrate Unconscious Perception?” The American Journal of Psychology 115
(2002), pp. 545–579. S. J. Haase, and G. Fisk, “Confidence in Word Detection Predicts Word
Identification: Implications for an Unconscious Perception Paradigm,” The American Journal
of Psychology 114 (2001), pp. 439–68. T. A. Visser, and P. M. Merikle, “Conscious and Unconscious Processes: The Effects of Motivation,” Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1999), pp.
94–113.
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detect visually presented words.30 In certain conditions, some subjects showed detection performance that was significantly worse than
chance. These words were presented so briefly that typically detection
performance would be near chance. We usually take chance-level as
the objective threshold for conscious perception. Below chance-level
performance could be taken as evidence that the subjects did not consciously perceive the words. And yet, if they had no information at all
regarding the words, performance should just be exactly at chance rather than below. It seems that these subjects were actively suppressing
the words.
These are unusual cases and are somewhat hard to interpret. We take
chance-level as the objective threshold for conscious perception because
when people perform at chance, it indicates that they do not have the explicit information regarding the target of perception. However, if people
perform significantly below chance, it means that somehow they have
the information regarding the detection, which violates the very logic we
adopt to label perception unconscious. But in any case, the stimuli were
supposed to be really weak, and it is intriguing that some subjects seem to
be automatically suppressing the words. Are we to take these somewhat
unusual cases as evidence to reject the notion that exclusion or inhibition
requires consciousness? It seems that, logically, if we claim that a certain
function requires consciousness, we should predict there will never be a
case where one could perform such function unconsciously. How seriously
are we to take this logic and reject functions as requiring consciousness by
a single experiment? We will return to this argument in the last section of
the paper.
4. Top-down Cognitive Control
So far we have discussed acts of volition that are relatively simple, like
starting a motor movement, or avoiding a particular action. Sometimes we
also voluntarily prepare for a set of rules or action plans in order to satisfy
a more abstract goal. For instance, a telephone ring may usually trigger
a particular action, e.g., to pick up the phone. However, when one visits
friends at their homes, one may deliberately change the mapping between
the stimulus (telephone ring) and action, i.e., it would be more appropriate to sit still, or ask the host to pick up the phone, rather than picking it
up yourself. This volitional change of stimulus-response contingency is an
example of top-down cognitive control.
It has been suggested that top-down cognitive control may require
consciousness.31 The idea is that unconscious stimuli can trigger certain

30
M. Snodgrass, and H. Shevrin, “Unconscious Inhibition and Facilitation at the Objective Detection Threshold: Replicable and Qualitatively Different Unconscious Perceptual Effects,” Cognition 101 (2006), pp. 43–79.
31
S. Dehaene, and L. Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness:
Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework,” Cognition 79 (2001), pp. 1–37.
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Figure 3. Experimental paradigm of Lau and Passingham (2007). Subjects view
briefly presented words and perform either a phonological task (is the word one
syllable or two syllables?) or a semantic task (does the word name something concrete or abstract?). Before word presentation, subjects are instructed which task to
perform on a given trial by a visual symbol (a square for the phonological task, or
a diamond for the semantic task). The symbolic instruction itself acts as a metacontrast mask for an earlier prime, also a square or a diamond. Because the prime is
briefly presented and masked, it is not consciously perceived. On half of trials, the
prime is congruent with the instruction and on the other half, incongruent. Behavioral and imaging results suggest that the unconscious primes affected top-down
task switching. When primes were incongruent with instructions, accuracy fell,
reaction time increased, and brain regions corresponding to the task indicated by
the prime were partially activated (all relative to the prime-congruent condition).
But when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and instruction
was lowered, such that primes became visible, the priming effect was not evident.
This double dissociation suggests that the interference of incongruent primes on
task switching cannot be attributed to conscious processing. Figure adapted from
Lau and Passingham, “Unconscious Activation.”

prepared actions, as demonstrated in studies in subliminal priming.32
However, the preparation or setting up of the stimulus-response contingency may require consciousness.
However, recent studies suggest that this might not be true, in the
sense that unconscious information seems to be able to influence or even
trigger top-down cognitive control too.33 In one study subjects had to prepare to do a phonological or semantic judgment, based on the orientation
of a figure they saw (see Fig. 3). In every trial, if they saw a square, they
32
S. Kouider, and S. Dehaene, “Levels of Processing During Non-conscious Perception: A
Critical Review of Visual Masking,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological Sciences 362 (2007), pp. 857–875.
33
U. Mattler, “Priming of Mental Operations by Masked Stimuli,” Perception and Psychophysics 65 (2003), pp. 167–187. H. C. Lau, and R. E. Passingham, “Unconscious Activation
of the Cognitive Control System in the Human Prefrontal Cortex,” The Journal of Neuroscience
27 (2007), pp. 5805–5811.
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had to prepare to judge whether an upcoming word has two syllables
(e.g., “table”) or not (e.g., “milk”). If they saw a diamond, they had to
prepare to judge whether an upcoming word refers to a concrete object
(e.g., “chair”) or an abstract idea (e.g., “love”). In other words, they had
to perform top-down cognitive control based on the instruction figure
(square or diamond). However, before the instruction figure was presented, there was actually an invisible prime figure, which could also be a
diamond or a square. It was found that the prime could impair subjects’
performance when it suggested the alternative (i.e., wrong) task to the
subjects. One could argue that this was only because the prime distracted
the subjects on a perceptual level, and did not really trigger cognitive
control. However, the experiment was performed in the fMRI scanner,
and the brain recordings suggest that when being primed to perform the
wrong task, subjects used more of the wrong neural resources too.34 That
is, areas that are more sensitive to phonological or semantic processing
showed increased activity when the explicit instruction figure made subjects perform the phonological and semantic tasks respectively. The invisible primes also seem to be able to trigger activations in task sensitive
areas. This seems to suggest that they can influence or exercise top-down
cognitive control.
Another study examines how unconscious information affects our
high-level objectives by focusing on how the potential reward influences our level of motivation.35 Subjects squeezed a device to win a certain
amount of money. The harder they squeezed, the more money they would
win. However, the size of the stake in question for a particular trial was
announced in the beginning by presenting the photo of a coin. The coin
could either be a British pound (~2 US dollars) or a penny (~2 US cents),
and it signified the monetary value of the maximal reward for that trial.
Not surprisingly, people squeezed harder when the stakes were high, but
interestingly, the same pattern of behavior was observed even when the
figure of the coin was masked such that subjects reported not seeing it.
This suggests that unconscious information can influence our level of motivation as well.
If unconscious information alone is sufficient to exercise all these sophisticated top-down control functions, why do we need to be conscious
at all?
5. How to Find the True Function of Consciousness
The foregoing is not meant to be an exhaustive review of all studies on
the potential functions of consciousness. We have selected some examples
from a few areas that are particularly related to volition, and discussed

Lau and Passingham, “Unconscious Activation.”
M. Pessiglione et al., “How the Brain Translates Money Into Force: A Neuroimaging
Study of Subliminal Motivation,” Science 316 (2007), pp. 904–906.
34
35
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what role consciousness may play. It may, of course, be that there are other psychological functions that require consciousness.
Yet, one cannot help but feel that there seems to be some inherent limitation to this whole enterprise of research. If we claim that a certain function requires consciousness, we are making the claim that the function
should never be able to be performed unconsciously. In principle, it would
only take a single experiment to falsify that. This explains why this review
may seem biased in that we focus on studies that show the power of the
unconscious, rather than studies demonstrating what functions definitely
require consciousness. In principle, falsifying the claim that a certain function requires consciousness is straightforward. But this is not the case for
demonstrating functions that do require consciousness.
One can of course try to show that subjects could normally do a task if
the relevant information is consciously perceived. And then one tries to
‘knock-out’ the conscious perception for such information, and try to show
that the task could no longer be performed. But how would one know that
in ‘knocking-out’ the conscious perception, one does not ‘knock-out’ too
much? One typically suppresses conscious perception by visual masking,
by using brief presentation, by distracting the subject, by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation, by pharmacological manipulations, etc.
But all of these could potentially impair the unconscious as well as the
conscious signal. Maybe in cases where the perception has been rendered
unconscious, the signal is just no longer strong enough to drive the function in question? This would mean that, in principle, it would be possible
for a future study to find the optimal procedure or setup to just render the
information unconscious, without reducing the signal strength too much.
And in that case the subjects may be able to perform the task in question.
That would falsify our claim.
This means that in looking for functions that require consciousness,
we need to adopt some different strategies. One potentially useful approach is to try to demonstrate something akin to a “double dissociation.”
When conscious perception is suppressed, we often find that a sophisticated function (e.g., top-down cognitive control) can no longer be performed, though some simpler function (e.g., priming for a prepared motor response) may still be activated by unconscious information. From
the foregoing discussion, one could see that this may not be as surprising
or informative as it seems. It could be just that the unconscious signal
is too weak to drive the relatively sophisticated function. A demonstration of the opposite would, however, be much more convincing: If after suppression of conscious perception, the subjects can still perform a
rather sophisticated function, but fail to perform a simple function, that
would suggest that the simple function really requires consciousness. In
this case, it could not be that the suppression of conscious perception has
taken away too much of the signal strength, because if that were the case
then the subjects should not be able to perform the relatively sophisticated function (see Fig. 4).
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Figure 4. (a) The normal situation for conscious perception. Stimuli are strong
enough to drive processes of different complexity. (b) A typical situation for unconscious perception. Stimuli are weak such that complicated processes are no
longer activated, though simple processes can still be triggered. It could be argued
that this is not surprising as we may expect that complicated processes require a
stronger signal. (c) A potentially more informative situation. If one could find a
stimulus that is not consciously perceived, but yet is sufficiently strong to trigger a
complicated process, then the relatively simple process that the stimulus does not
drive would seem to critically depend on consciousness.

An alternative approach may be to directly match for signal strength
between the conscious and the unconscious conditions. This might seem
radically difficult because conscious signals may seem to be strong in general. However, as discussed above, blindsight subjects can perform forcedchoice discrimination on visual stimuli well above chance, even when they
claim that conscious awareness is missing. Forced-choice performance is
often taken as an objective estimate of signal strength; the detection theoretical measure d’ is mathematically just the signal-to-noise ratio. In blindsight subject GY, where only half of the visual field lacks awareness, we
can imagine presenting weak stimuli to the normal visual field such that
forced-choice performance would match that in the blind field.36 This way
we can test if certain functions cannot be performed based on information
presented to the blind field, which may shed light on when consciousness
is required.
One may argue that blindsight patients are rare and the way their
brains process visual information may not be generalizable to intact
brains. However, there are other paradigms where in normal subjects
one could match for forced-choice performance, and yet produce a differ36
L. Weiskrantz, J. L. Barbur, and A. Sahraie, “Parameters Affecting Conscious versus Unconscious Visual Discrimination With Damage to the Visual Cortex (V1),” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 92 (1995), pp. 6122–6126.

VOLITION AND THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

551

Figure 5. Inducing “relative blindsight” in normal observers using metacontrast
masking. A. Metacontrast masking paradigm. The subject is presented with a visual target (in this case, either a square or diamond). Afterwards, a metacontrast
mask is presented. The mask differentially affects discrimination accuracy and
visual awareness of the target as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA).
B. Discrimination accuracy and visual awareness as a function of metacontrast
mask SOA. The metacontrast mask creates a characteristic U-shaped function
of performance vs. SOA. At shorter and longer SOAs, discrimination accuracy
is high, but it dips at intermediate SOAs. The same is true for visual awareness,
but the shape of the awareness masking function is not perfectly symmetrical
with respect to the performance masking function. That is, there are certain
SOAs at which forced choice performance is matched, but visual awareness differs significantly (e.g. as illustrated in the SOAs of 33 ms and 100 ms in fig 5B).
Such performance-matched conditions could be used to investigate the functions of consciousness. If some task can be performed better in the condition of
higher subjective visibility, it can plausibly be said to require visual awareness.
Because forced-choice discrimination accuracy is matched across the two conditions, the superior performance of the task in the high visibility condition cannot
be attributed to a difference in signal strength. Figure adapted from Lau and
Passingham, “Relative Blindsight.”

ence in the level of conscious awareness. For instance, in one study metacontrast masking was used to create similar conditions where forcedchoice discrimination accuracy for the visual targets was matched, and
yet the subjective reports of how often subjects saw the identity of the
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targets differed (see Fig. 5).37 One could imagine presenting these stimuli
to subjects and seeing if they drive a certain function with different effectiveness. If the subjects perform better in the condition where subjective
conscious awareness of the stimuli is more frequent, one could argue that
this function is likely to depend critically on consciousness.
6. Conclusion
Acts of volition are accompanied by a sense of conscious effort or intention. The fact that we feel the conscious effort is not in doubt. What is less
clear is whether the processes underlying the conscious experience directly
contribute to the execution of the actions in a way that is not accomplished
by unconscious processes just as effectively. The general picture seems to
be that many sophisticated functions can be performed unconsciously or
driven by unconscious information.
Does this mean that consciousness has no special function at all? The
answer is not yet clear. It is likely that some psychological functions do
require consciousness, i.e., can never be performed unconsciously, but experiments have not yet been able to convincingly pin them down.
They will have to overcome the following problem. If we assume that
conscious perception is always accompanied by stronger and longer-lasting signals that are more effective than unconscious signals in propagating themselves throughout the brain, then certainly, consciousness would
have the functions of these strong signals. However in studies of blindsight38 as well as in normals39 it has been shown that signal strength as
indicated by forced-choice performance is not always one and the same as
conscious awareness. Therefore, future studies may need to focus on identifying the functions that really cannot be performed unconsciously, even
when the signal strength is sufficiently strong. This may help to reveal the
true function of consciousness.
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